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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law reflects the intuitive understanding of creativity
in the eyes of the law. This is because copyright law’s primary goal
is to promote creativity.1 But is the legal understanding of creativity
in line with cognitive psychology’s understanding of the creative
process? This Article examines whether copyright law is harmonious with cognitive psychology’s understanding of creativity.
Some scholars posit that theories of creativity fit well with current
copyright law. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review,
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress has the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science . . . .”); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that copyright’s “ultimate aim” is “to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,
820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby
benefitting the artist and the public alike.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720
F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster
creativity.”); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law
should seek to promote . . . .”); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40
(2013) (“[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright that
defines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on
creativity).”).
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Joseph Fishman, a scholar studying the relationship between intellectual property and creativity, argued that, based upon some accounts of creativity, copyright law’s constraints on creativity actually push authors to create more original and creative works.2
This Article’s goal is to offer a broader assessment of creativity
studies and to question whether they indeed fit with copyright
law’s assumptions about creativity.
This Article focuses on four main doctrines and concepts in
copyright law. The first is the originality requirement in copyright
law.3 The second is the concept of romantic authorship. The third
is the idea/expression dichotomy that grants copyright protection
to expressions and denies it to ideas.4 The fourth, which is closely
related to the third, is the right to make derivative works.5 Copyright law treats derivative works separately from original works and
creates, to some extent, an identity between derivative works and
reproductions.6 This attitude toward derivative works is not easy to
justify. This Article examines whether the cognitive psychology of
creativity is consonant with this legal doctrine and how to best apply cognitive psychology’s findings to the law.
The copyright doctrines discussed in this Article are based
upon implicit and explicit assumptions about creativity. The originality doctrine, for example, is based upon the express assumption
that creative works include an original contribution from the author.7 By contrast, the idea/expression dichotomy has a more implicit assumption about creativity; it assumes that ideas are more
important to the promotion of creativity than expressions. This
implicit assumption is evidenced by different normative approach2

See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1360–90
(2015). Fishman’s argument is based upon the “path of least resistance” approach to
creativity and empirical studies based upon it. Id. This Article discusses this approach to
creativity as part of its broader theory of creative cognition, along with other approaches
to creativity. See infra Section IV.B.
3
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
4
See § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
5
See id. § 103(a).
6
See id.
7
See § 102(a).
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es to copyright law, such as utilitarian analysis and natural rights
theories, which suggest that non-protection of ideas is necessary
for promoting creativity and that the protection of expression is
harmful to creativity.8 The exclusive right to make derivative works
is based upon a similar assumption. Under a utilitarian analysis,
authors are properly granted an exclusive right to make derivative
works, if we assume an original author’s incentive to create derivative works promotes creativity that outweighs the creativity that
would result from second authors’ free access to preexisting expressions as the basis for the their works.9 In other words, the law
assumes that the free making of derivative works is less important
for promoting creativity than preserving the first author’s incentive
to create “original” works.
This Article contends that the law’s idea/expression dichotomy, which requires the same standard of review for both derivative
works and reproductions, is not justified under cognitive psychology’s understanding of the creative process. During the cognitive
process of creation, authors utilize their prior knowledge to crystallize abstract thoughts into new ideas. Specifically, authors employ domain-relevant knowledge and memory as building blocks in
their creative process. Cognitive psychology posits that both ideas
and expressions (in copyright terms) are possible knowledge components that creativity is based on and identifies both types of
knowledge as an inherent part of the creative process. This Article’s argument focuses on the descriptive-critical level, and argues that as far as the distinction between derivative works (based
on expressions of previous works) and original works (that are
based on abstract ideas or unprotected expressions) is concerned,
there is a mismatch between copyright law and cognitive psychology’s understanding of creativity. In fact, it is possible that the basic
8

For an economic analysis of the idea/expression dichotomy, see WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 91–92 (2003). For a Lockean justification for the idea/expression
dichotomy, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1581–83
(1993), and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 310–14
(1988).
9
For an economic analysis of the derivative work right, see LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 8, at 108–15. For a critique on this analysis, see infra note 384.
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idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law is also discordant with
cognitive psychology. Although a shift to a new copyright regime is
premature, a normative reevaluation of the legal justifications underlying the current regime is proper, considering this Article’s
conclusions. Additionally, the findings suggested in this Article
could be used as a basis for a normative discussion under various
approaches in the absence of other empirical data about the effects
current copyright law has on creativity.
Literature on the cognitive psychology of creativity includes
theoretical literature as well as empirical and historical studies that
seek to outline the various cognitive stages of the creative process
and the common pattern of creativity identifiable in authors’ cognitive process. This Article reviews the existing literature on the
cognitive psychology of creativity, discusses its main characteristics, and extracts several substantial notions about the various stages of the creative process and the importance of previous knowledge and memory in the creative process. These notions demonstrate that there is a gap between the way the law understands derivative work and its place in the creative world. This gap warrants
a reevaluation of the legal justifications underlying the exclusive
right to make derivative works, the scope of this right, and the remedies for infringement.10
The notion regarding the centrality of prior relevant knowledge
in the creative process, and its role as a knowledge component for
both ideas and expressions, is one of the grounds on which this Article argues that the law should conceptually separate mere reproductions from the making of derivative works under copyright.
Whereas mere reproductions are properly considered uncreative by
cognitive psychology and the law, derivative works are the result of
creative activity that is not qualitatively different from making an
“original” work. To reflect this distinction between creative and
10

It is important to note that, although this Article argues that copyright law and the
right to make a derivative work right should be analyzed in light of the cognitive
understanding of creativity, the creative process—even in its cognitive context—is fluid
and not predefined. It is likely that the cognitive process of creation is affected by various
factors that are external to the author and only one of these factors may be the law.
Nevertheless, the law’s effect on creativity should be scrutinized in order to maximize the
law’s efficacy.
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non-creative activities, copyright law should separate the reproduction right from the derivative work right.
In addition, two other aspects of cognitive psychology could illuminate copyright law. First, the cognitive psychology of creativity
could contribute to a better, more precise understanding of copyright law’s originality requirement. Copyright should embrace psychology’s understanding that not every creative product should be
considered entirely original. The second concerns copyright’s requirement of an independent contribution by the author. Postmodern copyright law purportedly utilizes a definition of independent contribution that is significantly narrower than the “romantic
author” approach, the predecessor to copyright’s current understanding of an independent contribution, which was criticized as
too broad.11 The cognitive process of creativity strongly suggests
that although a work of authorship has many sources external to
the author, the author nevertheless has an independent contribution that cannot be disregarded.
Before delving into the core arguments, it is important to outline several characteristics of cognitive psychology’s discourse on
creativity. First, this field does not distinguish between creative
activities that concern works of authorship in copyright terms and
creative activities that concern inventions in patent law terms.
Therefore, when necessary, this Article articulates the differences
that may arise in light of this lack of differentiation. Second, the
meaning of many terms in cognitive psychology is different from
both common parlance and legal terminology. Two main terms
warrant explanation here: The field of cognitive psychology uses
the terms “problem” or “task” to refer to the goal driving the author’s creative process.12 Put differently, these terms mean the task
that the creative activity revolves around.13 The creative environment in which the creative process takes place is referred to as a
“domain,” and this Article uses the term “task-domain” often.
This term means the creative environment relevant to the task the
author seeks to complete. Another important point is the meaning
11

See infra notes 364–72 and accompanying text.
See Todd I. Lubart, Models of the Creative Process: Past, Present and Future, 13
CREATIVITY RES. J. 295, 297 (2001).
13
See id.
12
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of the term knowledge. In cognitive psychology, knowledge includes various components of information. Some of these may appear to copyright experts as ideas in their legal sense. However, as
this Article points out, the term knowledge in cognitive psychology
includes informational components that reflect expressions in the
copyright sense.14
This Article is organized in the following manner: Part I discusses cognitive psychology’s relevance to the law. Part II presents
the predominant theories of the process of creation and emphasizes
the main characteristics of each group of theories. Part III divides
the cognitive process of creation into two main stages: the stage of
abstract unfocused ideation, and the stage of crystallization of a
preliminary idea using previous domain-relevant knowledge and
memory. Part IV uses theoretical, empirical and historical research
to explain the role of prior domain-relevant knowledge and memory in the process of creation. Finally, Part V discusses how the discourse of cognitive psychology and the notions extracted from it
may affect copyright law and, specifically, the right to make derivative works.
I. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW
A short discussion about the relevance of cognitive psychology
to the law and the connection of these two fields of knowledge is
appropriate. This discussion obviously has implications for the validity of the relationship between cognitive psychology of creativity
and copyright law as this Article suggests. When a connection between the law and an extralegal field of knowledge is suggested, the
first question to ask is what the relations between the two are. One
14

Two disclaimers are appropriate. First, this Article is not advocating for a direct link
between the use of prior knowledge and memory in the creative process and the creation
of derivative works in the legal context. In this sense, it does not argue that every work of
authorship is a derivative work because many works are based upon knowledge that the
law treats as a mere idea. The claim is limited to the argument that making derivative
works—i.e., using prior knowledge that contains explicit protected expression as part of
the creative process—is an inherent part of the creative process and is not qualitatively
different from making an original work with preexisting “ideas.” Second, this Article
does not suggest that the law’s distinction between original works and derivative works is
impossible to justify normatively. Instead, this Article posits that this distinction is
discordant with cognitive psychology’s understating of creativity.
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option is a relation of subordination, meaning that the law should
adapt itself to notions from the extralegal field. A second option is a
relation of description, explanation, and projection, meaning that
the extralegal field explains the law and the legal rules and describes their effects on the real world. A third option, sometimes
derived from the second, is a utilitarian relation, meaning that the
extralegal field could be used as a tool to design rules that will best
achieve the law’s goals.15 The relation between the law and an
extralegal field is derived from that field’s characteristics and theoretical goals. If the extralegal field has a normative goal, the first
type of relation is concerned. If, on the other hand, the extralegal
field has a descriptive goal, then the second or third relations are
relevant. This is demonstrated by the relation between economics
and psychology, and the relation between both and the law.
As far as economics is concerned, the neoclassical economic
theory could be viewed as normative because it proposes a maxim
of good that people should adhere to. This normative maxim of
wealth maximization is based on the Benthamian approach that “it
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure
of right and wrong.”16 A more concrete conceptualization of wealth
maximization is the sum of subjective individual preferences. To
apply the normative aspect of the economic theory, economists developed a secondary theory that is mostly descriptive. Thus, for
example, the neoclassical economic theory assumes that human
beings behave rationally.17 This assumption serves as a foundation
for explaining and predicting the conditions that will maximize the
sum of private preferences. Mathematical tools, such as formal
models could inform how this normative maxim is best fulfilled.

15

For a similar analysis, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998), which
suggests that different approaches to the law could be positive, descriptive, or normative,
and Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1997).
Steven Shavell, for example, recognized that the economic analysis in the context of law
has a normative aspect as well as a descriptive one. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–2 (2004).
16
JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT vi (1776).
17
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 18 (1994).
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Cognitive psychologists claim their field has an explanatory and
descriptive purpose, which follows from its place in the natural
sciences, as this branch of science aims to describe phenomena in
the world. Cognitive psychology seeks to examine and explain how
people perceive and process information.18 The scientific aspect of
the field is best demonstrated by reviewing the names of its subfields, such as experimental cognitive psychology, cognitive
sciences, and cognitive neuroscience.19 Cognitive neuroscience,
which examines the relationship between cognitive processes and
biological processes in the human brain, is a clear example of cognitive psychology’s explanatory and descriptive purpose.20 Additionally, in the remaining subfields of cognitive psychology, the declared research methodology is empirical and the aim of the researchers is to describe and explain information processing.21
The combination of economics and psychology—cognitive
psychology, specifically—and of both with the law, demonstrates
the different types of relationships discussed above. After refusing
to acknowledge psychology as science for decades, economic
theory began to absorb notions from the field of cognitive psychology in the second half of the twentieth century.22 This led to the
development of behavioral economics, an economic theory that
reviews basic assumptions and premises in neoclassical economics
in order to develop better and more accurate assumptions.23 For
example, behavioral economics challenges the rationality assumption, which holds that human beings behave rationally to maximize
their wealth and is an integral component of neoclassical econom-

18

See MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A
STUDENT’S HANDBOOK 1–3 (4th ed. 2000); Keith J. Holyoak, Psychology, in THE MIT
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES xxxix (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil
eds. 1999).
19
See EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 18, at 3.
20
See id. at 16–17; Thomas D. Albreit & Helen J. Neville, Neurosciences, in THE MIT
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES, supra note 18, at li.
21
See EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 18, at 3–12.
22
See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present,
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 5–7 (Colin F. Camerer & George
Lewenstein eds., 2004).
23
See id. at 7.
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ics.24 However, behavioral economics and notions from the field of
psychology did not lead to the rejection of the normative premises
of neoclassical economics, which are centered on achieving wealth
maximization.25 This is because principles of psychology have influenced only the theoretical level of economics, which is descriptive and explanatory rather than normative.
This is evident in the legal context as well. The basic premises
of neoclassical economics entered the legal field and led to the development of economic analyses of law.26 Economic theory was
applied to law in two aspects as well, normative and descriptive.
Thus, the economic analysis of law is based on the underlying normative standpoint that society should strive for wealth maximization.27 Additionally, the economic analysis of law as a descriptive
enterprise assumes—as neoclassical economics does—that human
beings behave rationally. This assumption underlies economic analyses’ predictions about human decision-making and the outcome
of different legal rules.28 Notions from psychology (and cognitive
psychology, specifically) entered the legal field primarily under the
economic analysis of law as a descriptive and explanatory theory.
Thus, the same notions about human behavior that substituted the
rationality assumption (and others) in neoclassical economics were
applied to law to import behavioral economics to the legal context.29 Here, too, the psychological notions had nothing to do with
the normative aspect of the discussion; instead, only descriptive
and explanatory psychological principles were applied to the law.30
24

See generally Kahneman, supra note 17; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251 (1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
25
See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 22, at 3.
26
See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 4.
27
See id. at 1–4; see also Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979).
28
See SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 4.
29
See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Tahler, supra note 15; Sunstein, supra note 15.
30
See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1997) (critiquing the application of behavioral economics to the
law by arguing that behavioral economics does not suggest a new normative maxim that
neoclassical economics did not account for). This criticism is overstated because the
purpose of importing behavioral notions into both economics and law was not normative;
rather, it satisfied explanatory and descriptive goals.
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The study of creativity within cognitive psychology is a scientific field that seeks to describe and explain the cognitive processes
underlying creative behavior.31 The scientific aspect of creativity
research is evident in many empirical studies, conducted under
various methodologies, that aim to explain and measure different
aspects of creative behavior.32 The theoretical goal of this Article is
to evaluate notions about creativity from the field of cognitive psychology and to use them as explanatory and descriptive tools to
improve copyright law. Like the psychological notions in economic
analysis, the discussion in this Article does not suggest an independent normative theory of copyright. However, the data and findings presented in this Article could lead to a better understanding
of the existing legal rules that govern creative behavior and their
relation to human behavior, and, thus, to a better application of existing normative approaches to the law.
II. THE CREATIVE COGNITION—THEORIES
The birth of the modern understanding of the cognitive process
of creation is attributed to British psychologist Graham Wallas and
his book The Art of Thought, which was published in 1926.33 In his
31

See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, The Concept of Creativity: Prospects
and Paradigms, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 3, 7 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999]. For a critical analysis of whether creativity
studies are scientific, see Robert T. Brown, Creativity: What Are We to Measure?, in
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 3, 6–8 (John A. Glover, Royce R. Ronning & Cecil R.
Reynolds eds., 1989) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1989].
32
For a discussion of research measuring creativity, see Dennis Hocevar & Patricia
Bachelor, A Taxonomy and Critique of Measurements Used in the Study of Creativity, in
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1989, supra note 31, at 53, and Jonathan A. Plucker & Joseph
S. Renzulli, Psychometric Approaches to the Study of Human Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF
CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 35. For a discussion of empirical research based on
experimental studies, see Mark A. Runco & Shawn Okuda Sakamoto, Experimental
Studies of Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 62. For a
discussion of the biological aspects of creativity and cognitive neuroscience research, see
Arne Dietrich, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Creativity, 11 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV.
1011 (2004); Colin Martindale, Biological Bases of Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF
CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 137; and Keith Sawyer, The Cognitive Neuroscience of
Creativity: A Critical Review, 23 CREATIVITY RES. J. 137 (2011).
33
See GRAHAM WALLAS, THE ART OF THOUGHT (1926). Creativity was discussed in
ancient times as well. Plato and Aristotle, for example, discussed the sources of creativity,
and in ancient Greece, the Greeks believed that Zeus and his nine daughters, the muses,
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book, Wallas described various cognitive stages of the creative
process that became the basis for current theories of creativity. In
the second half of the twentieth century, cognitive psychologists
strived to develop a comprehensive model of the creative process.
This Part presents the predominant theories of the cognitive
process of creation. In addition to outlining these approaches, this
Part shows that, despite their differences, they all dedicate significant discussion to authors’ use of prior domain-relevant knowledge, memory, and heuristics in the creative process. For this purpose, this Part uses the taxonomy offered in the field of cognitive
psychology for the different approaches,34 while referring to original literature and additional scholarship in order to conceptualize
different approaches to the creative process.
A. Stage and Componential Process Theories
The modern stage and componential approaches to creativity
are a direct continuation of Wallas’ scholarship, and therefore, to
understand them, it is important to first describe his stage theory of
creativity. Wallas hypothesized that four stages formed the creative
process: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.35
The preparation stage consists of a preliminary identification of
the problem or task at hand and its definition.36 Conscious thinking, reliance on the author’s prior knowledge, expertise, and analytical capabilities, and other components that draw from the auwere the source of creative thought. See ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY:
UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING, SCIENCE, INVENTION, AND THE
ARTS 90–92 (2006). In modern times, the beginning of scholarly thought about creativity
is attributed to Sigmund Freud and Henri Poincaré, who saw the source of creativity in
unconscious thinking. See id. at 92–94.
34
See Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto & Mark A. Runco, Theories of Creativity, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 20, 30–35 (James C. Kaufman & Robert J.
Sternberg eds., 2010).
35
See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 80.
36
See id. at 82–84. The literature on cognitive psychology typically uses the term
“problem” to describe the beginning of the creative process. The meaning of this term is
not identical to its common meaning; instead, it is more closely related to the term
“task.” The term refers to a wide range of instances that could lead to creative activity,
whether it is a specific professional or logical problem that needs to be solved, and
whether it is the beginning of a task (professional, artistic, scientific or otherwise) that is
ill-defined. See Lubart, supra note 12, at 297. This Part uses the terms “problem” and
“task” to describe the task an author pursues during the creative process.
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thor’s domain-relevant knowledge, characterize this stage.37 The
incubation stage is characterized by a lack of conscious thought
about the task, and the author often consciously engages in other
problems and tasks.38 At this stage, unconscious processes occur,
which consist mainly of associative thinking and the combination of
ideas.39 In the illumination stage, a promising idea breaks into the
consciousness of the author, who identifies that an idea is crystallizing in his mind intuitively.40 Finally, in the verification stage, the
author works consciously and examines, refines, and develops the
idea that passed into his consciousness during the illumination
stage.41 The author also examines the validity of the idea and crystallizes it into its exact form.42
Wallas’ stage theory was the basis for empirical studies that
sought to verify his theory. In addition, the theory was the basis for
more elaborate theoretical models in the same spirit.43 However,
Wallas’ division to four stages was too vague to account for the various characteristics of the creative process, and his focus on the
different components included in each stage lacked detail.44 For
example, Wallas did not explain the relationship between the different stages or their significance and position in the creative
process.45 In addition, Wallas did not explain the sub-processes of
each stage, which was particularly problematic for the incubation
stage.46 One of the most significant models that was developed on
the basis of Wallas’ stage theory in order to fill in the gaps was Teresa Amabile’s componential model to creativity, which was first
37

See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 82–84 (describing the author at the preparation stage
as an “educated” person who is proficient in distinguishing between ideas and memory
encoding, and has gathered a wide spectrum of facts that allow him more associative
possibilities); see also Lubart, supra note 12, at 296.
38
See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 86.
39
See id.
40
See id. at 97.
41
See id. at 81.
42
See id.
43
See, e.g., Sandra E. Moriarty & Bruce G. Vandenbergh, Advertising Creatives Look at
Creativity, 18 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 162, 166 (1984) (identifying Wallas’ four stages
through a qualitative survey of advertisers’ work); see also Lubart, supra note 12, at 297
(classifying Amabile’s approach as a continuation of Wallas’ work).
44
See Lubart, supra note 12, at 299.
45
See id. at 298–99.
46
See, e.g., id.
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introduced in her book The Social Psychology of Creativity, published
in 1983,47 and later updated in her 1996 book, Creativity in Context.48
Amabile, as well as Wallas, suggested four main stages in the
creative process. Her first stage is the problem or task presentation
stage.49 This stage comes into play when the author is highly motivated to identify a problem or to engage in a task, or when the problem or task are presented by an external entity.50 The second stage
is the preparation stage, which Amabile defined as the stage where
the author constructs or activates a task-relevant knowledge database.51 When the author has sufficient task-relevant knowledge and
expertise, this stage may be significantly shortened.52 The third
stage is the response generation stage in which the author generates possible responses to the task or problem by searching, consciously or unconsciously, for possible solution paths.53 The fourth
stage is the response validation stage, which Amabile described as
the stage in which task-relevant knowledge and skills have a significant role.54 In this stage, the potential generated responses are analyzed using existing knowledge and formed in a way that will fit the
solution and be functional.55
In addition to her four stages, Amabile emphasized three cognitive components that come into play in each of the stages.56 The
first component, and the most important one for the purpose of
this Article, is the domain-relevant skills component.57 Amabile
defined this component as one that contains all possible responses
47

See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY (1983)
[hereinafter AMABILE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY].
48
See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996) [hereinafter
AMABILE, CONTEXT].
49
See id. at 95.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
See id. This Article uses task-relevant knowledge to refer to knowledge that is
relevant to the environment of the creative activity. This means the knowledge and
expertise that are related to the specific creative environment and tradition.
53
See id. at 55–56.
54
See id. at 96.
55
See id.
56
See id. at 83.
57
See id. at 85.
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that the author can perceive.58 A new response is generated from
this pool of possible responses and then validated using taskrelevant information and knowledge.59 This component also includes the author’s prior factual knowledge about the task-domain
that consists of facts, principles, common paradigms, and aesthetic
criteria, as well as technical abilities that are necessary for the taskdomain.60 She argued that there is significant importance in the
way task-relevant knowledge is stored and coded; information
coded by general principles will be more useful to the author than a
bundle of facts with narrow applicability.61 This component was
identified by Amabile as mainly within the preparation and response validation stages.62
The second component Amabile identified is creativityrelevant skills.63 She defined this component as the “something
extra” that is required for creative activity.64 It is what determines
the amount that by which the new idea surpasses the old ideas that
it is built upon.65 Without creative-relevant skills, even authors
with excellent task-relevant skills will be unable to create a new
product.66 Amabile offered the following set of characteristics to
describe this component: the ability to break through common conceptions; the ability to develop new cognitive systems for problem
solving; the ability to understand complex situations; the ability to
maintain a wide range of available responses over time; suspension
of response validation; the use of the widest categories possible;
and precise memory and creative conception of works in the
world.67 This component includes knowledge about the task58

See id.
See id.
60
See id. at 85–86. This component includes knowledge of the general technique that is
related to the relevant task and, more importantly, knowledge and familiarity with
concrete previous instances that are related to the task and could be used to complete the
relevant task. This means that the task-relevant knowledge also includes visual (or
audible) memory of previous works known to the author. See id.
61
See id. at 95.
62
See id. at 95–96.
63
See id. at 86–90.
64
See id. at 86.
65
See id.
66
See id. at 88.
67
See id. at 88–89.
59

302

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:287

relevant heuristics that could operate in both an explicit and conscious mode or in an implicit and unconscious one.68 Amabile identified this component as related to the response generation stage.69
The third component Amabile identified is task motivation.70
This component distinguishes between the author’s inner taskmotivation (i.e., the personal interest the author has in a specific
task) and outer task-motivation (i.e., a social or professional constraint that obliges the author to engage with a specific task).71 According to Amabile, while the first enhances creativity, the latter
inhibits the author’s creative abilities.72 The motivation component
affects both the task presentation and the response validation stages.73
In another example, cognitive psychologists Mark Runco and
Ivonne Chand introduced a five-component model for creativity in
1995.74 These components are divided into two tiers.75 The first
tier consists of problem finding, idea finding, and evaluation components.76 The problem-finding component includes identifying
and defining a problem or task, and the idea finding component reflects creativity and mental flexibility.77 The evaluation component
reflects critical thinking about an idea.78 The second tier includes
knowledge (divided into declarative and procedural knowledge)
and motivation (divided into internal and external motivation).79
Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge of strategies that facili68

See id. at 89. Amabile defined “heuristics” as any principle or instrument that
contributes to the reduction of the average solution search time. See id. (citing Allen
Newell et al., The Processes of Creative Thinking, in CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO
CREATIVE THINKING: A SYMPOSIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 63, 78
(Gruber et al. eds., 1962)).
69
See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 94.
70
See id. at 90–93.
71
See id. at 90–91.
72
See AMABILE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 47, at 91.
73
See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 93.
74
See Mark A. Runco & Ivonne Chand, Cognition and Creativity, 7 EDUC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 243, 245 (1995).
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
See id.
79
See id.
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tate accomplishing task-relevant processes (i.e., know-how).80 Declarative knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the author’s factual
knowledge.81 Runco and Chand placed these components in the
second tier because they contribute to the creative process more
than they control it.82
Despite the similarities between Runco and Chand’s and Amabile’s models, some differences should be articulated. While Amabile attributed the task-relevant skills to the preparation and response validation stages, Runco and Chand argued that knowledge
(declarative and procedural) affects not only the problem-finding
stage, but also the idea finding stage.83 This is significant because
Amabile identified a stage in the creative process where prior
knowledge has no contribution, whereas Runco and Chand posited
that knowledge affects every stage of the creative process.84
The componential models to creativity were criticized on several grounds. First, because these approaches suggest a wide array
of components that are interrelated, they were criticized due to
lack of parsimony.85 Second, the models are difficult to verify empirically because every component must be identified and measured separately to reach a valid conclusion.86 Third, the approaches

80

See id. at 246.
See id. It is important to emphasize that the term “factual knowledge” does not refer
to facts in the copyright sense. The meaning of the term is visual, semantic, or symbolic
knowledge that includes all task-relevant details in the author’s memory. In this sense,
factual knowledge could consist of informative factual knowledge as well as concrete
expressions of preexisting task-related works. For example, when a painter seeks to paint
a sunflower field, several types of knowledge could come into play. Procedural knowledge
in this context includes painting methods and techniques, and the painter’s professional
abilities and expertise. Declarative knowledge in this context consists of several types of
information as well. Simple facts include the painter’s acquaintance with the sunflower
and its visual form in nature. Another type of declarative knowledge is preexisting visual
works use of sunflowers in different visual ways and any specific visual images of
sunflowers.
82
See id. at 245–46.
83
See id. at 245.
84
See id.
85
See Todd I. Lubart, Componential Models, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY 295,
299 (Mark A. Runco & Steven R. Pritzker eds., 1999).
86
See id.
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do not explain which stage or component is most important to creativity.87
Every one of the models in the stage and componential approaches dedicates significant attention to knowledge-based components throughout the creative process. In Wallas’ theory, the use
of prior knowledge is evident in both the preparation stage, when
the author uses his previous education and knowledge, and the validation stage, in which the author validates the creative product in
light of his task-relevant knowledge.88 Under Amabile’s approach,
prior knowledge plays a significant role in task presentation, preparation, response generation, and validation.89 In the preparation
and validation stages, according to Amabile, the author uses his
task-relevant skills, which include factual (semantic) knowledge.90
Runco and Chand, for their part, emphasized the use of taskrelevant declarative knowledge in every part of the creative
process.91
Under each of these theories, the use of prior knowledge consists of various types of information that could be used as a basis for
a work of authorship. Ideas (in their legal sense) are obviously included as well as methods, processes, and other abstract components that are essential to the creative process. However, the description of the task-relevant knowledge under these theories includes the use of knowledge components that reflect concrete and
explicit expressions (in the legal sense) formed from works that are
stored in the author’s memory. Both types of knowledge could be
the basis of creative activity under cognitive psychology.
Copyright law only partially matches the cognitive understanding of creativity. With respect to the use of prior knowledge in preliminary phases of the creative process—for example, in the input
and processing phases (reflected in the preparation and incubation
stages in Wallas’ model, 92 or the preparation and response genera-

87
88
89
90
91
92

See id. at 289–99.
See WALLAS, supra note 33, at 80, 86.
See AMABILE, CONTEXT, supra note 48, at 94.
See id.
See Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 248.
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
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tion stages in Amabile’s model)93—copyright law allows the use of
any type of knowledge that the theories consider. This is because
copyright law is not interested in the preliminary phases of creativity. It is concerned only with the concrete final creative product: the
output. With regard to the output, however, copyright law allows
the use of ideas or unprotected expressions as the basis for creativity, but it does not allow the use of protected expressions (with
some exceptions, including the fair use doctrine). This is in contrast to the approaches presented above that view expressions as
relevant knowledge types for creativity in all of their phases.94
In addition, it is important to emphasize that Wallas and Amabile identified stages in the creative process where the author has
an individual contribution and prior knowledge does not play a
role.95 This is evident in Wallas’ illumination stage and in Amabile’s response generation stage.96 Even in Runco and Chand’s
model, which holds that knowledge affects every stage of the creative process, there is specific attention to the author’s individual
contribution to the creative process in the ideation stage.97 These
findings support copyright law’s originality requirement, which
affords copyright protection only when the author’s expression
displays a modicum of creativity original to the author.98 This is in
contrast to post-modern approaches that reject the “romantic author” approach.99 In this sense, copyright law matches the cognitive understanding of creativity.
B. Creativity as a Cognitive Process
Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto, and Mark A. Runco, researchers in the field of cognitive psychology who study the crea93

See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35–91 and accompanying text.
95
See supra notes 35–73 and accompanying text.
96
See supra notes 40, 53 and accompanying text.
97
See supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text.
98
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship. . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
99
The “romantic author” approach sees the individual author as the only source for
any work of authorship and describes the creative process as an individual endeavor in
which the work is created out of nothing. See infra Section V.B.
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tive process, identified a group of theories that concentrates on
cognitive processes that characterize the creative process, which
they named “cognitive theories.”100 These approaches aim to
identify cognitive abilities and processes that are necessary for creative activity and focus on the process of creation and on the author.101 The main difference between this group of approaches and
the stage and componential theories is that the cognitive theories
do not concentrate on the timeline of the creative process or on the
chronological stage at which sub-processes take place. Instead, they
focus on the type of cognitive processes that are relevant and necessary for creativity.
American psychologist J.P. Guilford, who tried to distinguish
between divergent and convergent thinking, developed one of the
most important models in this group of theories.102 Divergent
thinking refers to the unfocused process of associative thought that
leads to different directions and may cause an original task-relevant
idea to occur.103 Convergent thinking, in contrast, occurs when
cognition seeks to find a correct, applicable, and usable solution
that fits task-relevant conventions, mainly using deduction.104 At
this stage, there is significant use of stored memory that affects the
creative product.105
A similar model was suggested by John R. Suler who referred to
two sub-processes in the creative process—primary and secondary—based upon principles of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis.106
The primary sub-process of thinking usually occurs unconsciously
and was described by Suler as more primitive than the secondary
sub-process.107 During this sub-process, memories and past experiences mix together; thought is mainly metaphoric because the

100

See Kozbelt, Beghetto & Runco, supra note 34, at 31.
See id.
102
See J.P. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 138 (1967); see also
WEISBERG, supra note 33, at 95–97.
103
See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 138.
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See id. at 171.
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See id. at 313–15.
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See John R. Suler, Primary Process Thinking and Creativity, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 144
(1980).
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See id.
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borderlines between memories are fuzzy.108 In contrast, the second
sub-process is characterized by conceptual organization of memory.109 In this sub-process, the author is able to access and control
the unfocused thoughts developed in the primary sub-process and
crystallize them into socially meaningful products.110
Liane Gabora, a researcher who contributed to this line of theories, observed that the creative process requires phases of unfocused and focused thought and the ability to combine the two.111
Gabora’s significant contribution in this context is the use of tools
from neuroscience and the cognitive sciences to propose a biological conceptualization of these processes.112 Gabora explained that
the human memory is “stored” in neurons and each neuron is responsible for the storage of several memories.113 Each memory is
split between different neurons.114 Access to stored memories depends on contextual stimulations; a specific stimulation activates a
group of cells containing various neurons that respond to the stimulation.115 Gabora argued that in a state of unfocused thought
many cell groups and their respective neurons, which are otherwise
inactive, are activated,.116 These excess neurons are referred to as
“neurds.”117 Thus, Gabora proposed that the purpose of unfocused thought is to gather neurds to use as a solution for the relevant task or problem.118 The relevant neurons will pass through to
the focused thought and the author will use them to crystallize a
concrete idea.119 According to this approach, which was named the
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See id. at 145.
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See id. at 145–46.
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“honing theory of creativity,” unfocused thought leads to original
but impractical ideas that are honed using focused thought.120
Ronald A. Finke, Thomas B. Ward, and Steven M. Smith presented a different theory of creativity called the “Geneplore”
model in 1992.121 The name of the model is derived from its main
two processes, generate and explore, which that are subject to constraints that depend on the creative product.122 Fink, Ward, and
Smith defined the model as more heuristic than explanatory, and
said its aim is to show that most creative activities could be described in terms of primary production of potential ideas followed
by thorough research of these ideas.123 Different types of idea production processes include restoring memory structures, creating
simple associations from these structures, and recombining them
or transferring the memory structures to new forms.124
It is important to clarify that the term “ideas” in the context of
the Geneplore model does not have the same meaning as the
equivalent legal term; rather, it refers to the production of any part
of the creative product.125 Different types of exploration processes
include the search for new characteristics of mental structures, the
search for compatible metaphors, the search for new operability of
existing memory structures, and the evaluation of the potential to
use them in different contexts.126 This model does not distinguish
between generation and exploration processes and posits that the
author switches between different modes many times throughout
the creative process.127 Finally, the Geneplore model assumes that
the relevant task or the end product can cast constraints on both
120

See Nicholas Davis & Ellen Yi-Luen Do, Quantifying the Artistic Experience with
Perceptive Sketching Tools: Cognitive Technologies to Support Creativity Researchers, 22
COMUNICAÇÃO & SOCIEDADE 76, 80 (2012).
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See RONALD A. FINKE, THOMAS B. WARD & STEVEN M. SMITH, CREATIVE
COGNITION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS 17–43 (1992).
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See id. at 17–28.
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See Thomas B. Ward, Steven M. Smith & Ronald A. Finke, Creative Cognition, in
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 1999, supra note 31, at 189, 191.
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See FINKE, WARD & SMITH, supra note 121, at 20; Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note
123, at 191–92; Lubart, supra note 12, at 299–300.
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See Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 191.
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processes at any point during the creative process.128 An example
of such constraints is restricted resources of limited operability.129
These approaches best illustrate the general division of the creative process into two sub-processes: the unfocused phase, in
which abstract ideas are created,130 and the focused phase, in which
the ideas are crystallized into concrete form.131 Guilford, Suler, and
Gabora made an explicit division between these two stages: They
showed that the focused phase of creativity is characterized by utilizing prior task-relevant knowledge and memory.132 Guilford and
Gabora stressed that stored memory plays a crucial part in creativity.133 Though they did not explicitly define whether this use of
memory includes ideas or expression in copyright terms, they did
refer to the use of complete memory units,134 and it is more than
likely that such a use consists of both ideas and expression. Finke,
Ward, and Smith, for their part, showed that knowledge and memory play a significant role in every phase of creativity.135 In addition,
the idea generation part of their model is specifically characterized
by the restoration of existing memory structures and recombination
in order to produce new creative products.136 Here, too, there was
reference to the use of preexisting expression (in copyright terms)
as a basis for creativity, since these memory structures are capable
of bearing concrete expressions as well as ideas. When a memory
structure that holds task-relevant preexisting works is restored, it is
more than likely that it will contain expressions rather than mere
ideas.137
A substantial match between the cognitive approaches to creativity and copyright law is evident here as well. Copyright law allows the use of many types of knowledge and memory components
128
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for the crystallization of unfocused ideas into concrete creative
products.138 Among these are abstract ideas (or methods, facts and
processes) as well as unprotected expression (in the public domain
or by fair use).139 However, as far as the use of protected expressions during the output phase of creativity is concerned, there is a
mismatch between copyright law’s derivative work right and the
cognitive theories of creativity.
Similar to the discussion of theories about the stages of creativity, the creative cognition theories focus on the independent contribution of the author to the creative product. Notably, Guilford, Suler, and Gabora’s models included a phase of unfocused cognition
that is not related to the use of prior knowledge.140 It also appeared
in the Geneplore model, which articulated the independent cognitive features of the author that are not attributed to prior knowledge.141 In the context of copyright law, these theories have implications on the romantic author discourse and on the originality requirement.142 Later sections show that the division to two main
sub-processes is also compatible with other theories of creativity.
C. Creativity as Problem Solving
One of the most significant theories on the process of creation
posits that it is a problem-solving process.143 However, in contrast
to classical problem solving, where the goal is known but the paths
to the solution are not, this theory holds that the creative process is
characterized by ill-defined goals and problems.144 Further, al138
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140
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though there may be cases in which there is no problem at all, it is
usually possible to split ill-defined problems into well-defined subproblems in a way that fits the classical model of problem-solving
theory.145 Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco also noted that these approaches focus both on the creative process and the author—the
former because these approaches deal with common cognitive psychology approaches that refer to the representation of problem and
heuristic searching, and the latter by emphasizing the expertise that
is required from the author in the specific task-domain.146
Guilford suggested one of the first models of creative problem
solving.147 His model was based on several main recursive stages
that are connected with intermediary processes that affect the
problem-solving process.148 The first stage Guilford proposed is the
filtering stage, during which the author’s attention is directed to a
specific input.149 The next stage is cognition, in which the author
recognizes the problem and defines it.150 At this stage, the author’s
cognition is open to receiving additional inputs from the environment.151 The following stage is production, in which potential solutions to the problem are produced.152 Then, another cycle of the
cognition and production stages appears; new knowledge is gathered and additional potential solutions are created.153 This cycle
ends when a potential solution is compatible with the problem.154 In
between each of these stages, there is an intermediate stage of
evaluation where the author checks the validity of the input, the
potential solutions, and the problem structure.155 The foundation of
the entire process is the author’s stored memory, which feeds
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every one of the different stages.156 Importantly, when Guilford
discussed stored memory, he referred to different types of information, such as visual-figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral.157
Philip Johnson-Laird, a psychologist professor and researcher
focusing, among other things, on the creative process, proposed
another model for creativity which fits the problem-solving and expertise category.158 He theorized that five assumptions underlie the
creative process: (1) the outcome of the process must be innovative
for the author; (2) the outcome of the process may be innovative
for society, but the author’s mental process will be the same even if
another author has already reached the same outcome; (3) presumably, the creative products are unknown in advance; (4) creativity
adheres to preexisting constraints and conventions, whether external or internal to the author, and the author does not function as a
closed system but is affected by existing aesthetic values; (5) works
of authorship are not composed of “nothing;” rather, they are
founded on preexisting grounds that function as raw material even
for the most original works.159
The problem-solving and expertise approach to creativity is
supported by a wealth of empirical and historical studies. Experimental research demystified some of the cognitive processes underling creative innovation by showing that prior failed solution
attempts leads to proper problem representation and heuristic
learning that is crucial to creativity.160 In addition, historical studies
based on personal manuscripts of important artists have also shown
that expertise plays an integral role in the creative process. American cognitive psychologist John R. Hayes, for example, studied five
hundred works of seventy-six great composers and found that only
three were composed before the tenth year of the composer’s career.161 As a result, some scholars have postulated that there is a
156
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“10-year rule,” requiring at least ten years of experience to create
masterpieces.162 Other significant experiments have shown how
artists and scientists explicitly utilize previous works to improve
their creative skills.163
The creative problem-solving and expertise approaches best illustrate the importance of task-relevant knowledge to the creative
process and the significance of prior knowledge and memory to innovation. These approaches—mainly Guilford’s—explain that the
use of prior knowledge and memory applied to various types of information also include concrete and material types of knowledge
and not only ideas, processes, or methods.164 In this sense, it includes expression (in copyright terms) as an information type that
is at the basis of creativity. Part III uses the historical research that
verifies these theories to demonstrate the importance of knowledge
and memory in creativity. In addition, the Part shows that these
approaches fit the general division of the creative process into two
sub-processes. However, it is important to note that the creative
problem-solving approaches were criticized for two reasons: their
inability to explain how authors identify problems at the beginning
of the creative process; and their significant focus on expertise and
prior knowledge as the only source of creativity.165 This difficulty is
especially relevant to creative activities in which the problem is illdefined or does not exist because the activation of a heuristic mechanism in the problem-domain cannot account for the first stage
of creativity.166 The problem-finding approach to creativity completes this gap.
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D. Creativity as Problem Finding
The problem-finding approach was proposed primarily as a
reaction to the problem-solving approach to creativity and its
shortcoming in explaining how authors identify problems and initiate the required motivation to engage in problem solving.167 The
problem-finding approach is attributed first and foremost to Jacob
Getzels and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, two leading and
groundbreaking creativity researchers who pointed out the importance of theorizing the problem-finding stage of creativity in
1976.168 They argued that problem finding is a crucial first step to
problem solving, and that is it not necessarily separated from the
solution itself.169 To test this hypothesis, they observed thirty-one
art students performing an open task that required them to draw a
set of objects provided by the researchers.170 The study suggested
that the openness of an author to a problem, and his investigative
behavior while creating and adjusting the structure and content of
the preliminary problem, indicate that the author is engaged in
problem finding while searching for a solution for the first identified problem.171
However, Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco emphasized that the
problem-finding approach, which was much more subjective, was
not sufficiently validated through empirical research.172 They argued that the research, which attempted to explain this approach,
empirically could be better conceptualized under problem-solving
models.173 Thus, they argued that the distinction between both approaches is explained by scholars’ differing emphasis and goals,
rather than by the substantive differences in the two scholars’
theories.174 For example, if one is interested in the subjective motivation of authors, he would focus on the problem-finding approach;
whereas, if one wishes to focus on the cognitive processes that
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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See id. at 34.
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cause the creation of new ideas, he would focus on the problemsolving approach.
The problem-finding approach is a complementary stage to the
problem-solving approach in the sense that it accounts for the individual contribution of the author within the process of creation,
when the problem-solving approach does not. If the two approaches are understood as two components of the same creative process,
they are compatible with the description of the creative process as a
two-phase process of unfocused and focused cognitive activity. In
the legal context, the problem-finding approach emphasizes the
independent contribution of the author to the creative product and
conflicts with the post-modern approaches that diminished the author’s role in the creative process.
III.

CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE UNFOCUSED THOUGHT—
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY
In spite of the differences between the various theories that
seek to explain the cognitive process of creation, they all share general characteristics that have important implications for copyright
law in general and, specifically, for the right to make derivative
works. This Part argues that all the approaches include a division of
the creative process into two main sub-processes. Thus, it is possible to characterize the creative process as follows: At the first
stage, the author engages in unfocused thought where she has significant individual contribution to the process; and, at the second
stage, the unfocused thought is crystallized into a concrete creative
product in a way that is mainly dictated by prior task-relevant
knowledge and memory stored in the author’s brain. Each of these
processes has implications for copyright law.
A. Unfocused Thought—Associative Thought and Abstract Ideas
The first characteristic all approaches to creativity have in
common is that they refer to a phase of unfocused attention during
which abstract ideas of the creative activity are formed. For example, in Wallas’ stage theory, the incubation stage is characterized
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by unfocused associative thought.175 Similarly, the response generation stage in Amabile’s model is characterized by abstract cognitive
processes, which are driven by highly abstract creative-relevant
skills.176 Runco and Chand also refer to this creative phase in their
idea presentation stage, which is described by unfocused creative
thinking.177
Further, the unfocused thought phase is explicitly mentioned in
some of the creative cognition approaches. Guilford, for example,
referred to it as part of the divergent thinking process, which he
described as unfocused and associative.178 Similarly, Suler referred
to the primary thought process as a metaphorical phase in which
memories are not separated from one another.179 Gabora’s model
offered a biological description of the unfocused phase of creativity
when she described the formation of “neurds” during unfocused
stimulation of neuron groups, which import relevant memory and
knowledge into the focused thought stage.180
Finke, Ward, and Smith’s Geneplore model more subtly distinguishes between the two phases. However, significant characteristics of the generation component of the model are compatible with
the unfocused thought description. The generation component includes, for example, associative thought that is followed by new
potential ideas.181 In addition, some characteristics of the exploration component of the model are also compatible with unfocused
thought, for instance, the metaphorical thought which the authors
attribute to the exploration component.182
When considering the problem-solving and problem-finding
approaches together, it is evident that they also refer to components that are compatible with the unfocused thought phase. For
example, although Guilford’s model appears highly structured and
175
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See GUILFORD, supra note 102, at 138.
179
See Suler, supra note 106, at 144.
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based on analytical phases of knowledge use, it also recognizes the
role of illumination and intuition in the creative process.183 Johnson-Laird’s assumption that the products of the creative process
cannot be pre-known,184 along with the notion that ill-defined problems could be split into several well-defined problems,185 illustrates
that the problem-solving approach identifies a stage that is not solely analytic and not necessarily based on knowledge and expertise.
Thus, these approaches also fit the unfocused thought phase of
creativity and the problem-finding approach.
The discussion thus far shows that the predominant approaches to the cognitive process of creativity systematically identify stages and components in which unfocused thought occurs and produces preliminary abstract ideas at the early stages of the creative
process. However, for the purpose of this Article, the more relevant stage of creativity is the phase in which the abstract ideas are
crystallized into a socially valuable concrete product. The next Section discusses how each of these theories identifies stages of crystallization of ideas using task-relevant knowledge and memory.
B. The Use of Task-Relevant Knowledge
The second characteristic that all approaches to creativity share
is reliance on preexisting task-relevant knowledge and memory in
different stages of the creative process. One example is found in
Wallas’ stage theory. The use of task-relevant knowledge is evident
in two main stages: the preparation and validation stages. In the
preparation stage, as described by Wallas, the author uses prior expertise and task-relevant knowledge to prepare for the creative
process.186 At the validation stage, the author consciously examines
the preliminary ideas in light of his task-relevant expertise. Knowledge plays a crucial role at this point as well. In fact, Wallas himself described the preparation and validation stages as strongly interrelated.187
183
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Amabile’s further developed stage model explicitly acknowledged the use of task-relevant knowledge. The model defined taskrelevant skills as one of the three components of the creative
process.188 Like the analysis suggested above with regard to Wallas’
theory, Amabile attributed the use of task-relevant knowledge to
the preparation and response validation stages.189 It thus seems that
Amabile dedicated a significant and explicit attention to the use of
task-relevant knowledge in the creative process.190 Runco and
Chand also explicitly acknowledged the significance of taskrelevant knowledge (which they referred to as declarative knowledge) as a main component that affects the problem presentation
and ideation stages.191
The use of task-relevant knowledge is also emphasized in the
creative cognition approaches. Guilford’s convergent thinking included analytical skills and the use of knowledge and memory as he
stated explicitly.192 The secondary thought process described by
Suler also fits the use of prior task-relevant knowledge because its
purpose is to consciously control and form abstract ideas into concrete products.193 The same applies for Gabora’s honing model of
creativity, in which the author’s memory holds the most significant
part.194 Although Gabora identified the use of memory at the phase
of unfocused thought, she explicitly noted that it is used in the focused thought phase when memory cells are activated along with
the sporadic ideas created by activation of “neurds.”195 The generation process in Finke, Ward, and Smith’s Geneplore model also
consisted of task-relevant knowledge use.196 The researchers defined this process as including the restoration of knowledge and
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memory structures and adapting them for compatibility with the
relevant task.197
The problem-solving approach to creativity best illustrates the
significance and centrality of task-relevant knowledge and memory
to the process of creation. The essence of this approach is the understanding of the creative process as a logical-analytical system to
problem solving that is based on task-relevant expertise and previous knowledge.198 The use of prior knowledge is evident in Guilford’s model, in which memory storage is used during every cognitive activity throughout the creative process.199 He expressly referred to the importance of knowledge in the creative process and
explained that it was characterized by restoring, reproducing, and
adapting memory structures into a new product.200 Guilford also
articulated the different types of information that are used, including semantic, visual, and symbolic knowledge.201 Johnson-Laird’s
approach also focused on task-relevant knowledge and the crucial
role of memory in the process of creation. Indeed, two of his five
assumptions about creativity concern these components: He
pointed out that the creative process must fit predefined creative
constraints and be based upon preexisting elements.202 In addition,
Robert Weisberg, an American cognitive psychologist who focused
on creativity studies and the study of geniality, demonstrated the
importance of task-relevant knowledge and expertise in a series of
experiments.203
Thus, the cognitive process of creation is divided into two main
sub-processes: (1) unfocused thought, during which abstract ideas
form as a result of the author’s associative thought; and (2) the use
of task-relevant knowledge and memory during focused thought for
197
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the purpose of crystallizing preliminary abstract ideas into a concrete perceivable form. As noted above, the two sub-processes are
relevant to copyright law.204 The first sub-process is relevant to the
discussion on the independent and original contribution of the author to a creative product—copyright law’s originality requirement—especially in light of post-modern discourse on the romantic author approach. The second sub-process is most relevant to
the idea/expression dichotomy and the derivative work right because the use of prior knowledge is an inherent part of the creative
process and incorporates what copyright law refers to as a derivative work. Further, the second sub-process reveals a mismatch between the law and the cognitive psychology of creativity. The next
Part will focus on how cognitive psychologists describe the use of
prior task-relevant knowledge and the notions that arise from these
descriptions, which, as discussed below, have important implications for copyright law and the derivative work right.
IV.

THE USE OF TASK-RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE AND
MEMORY IN THE CREATIVE PROCESS
The use of task-relevant knowledge and memory are a crucial
and inseparable part of creativity under cognitive psychology’s
predominant approaches to creativity. Now, it is important to discuss the way task-relevant knowledge and memory are formed and
used. To this end, this Part discusses theoretical notions about the
use of prior knowledge that are based on empirical and historical
studies of the cognitive process of creativity. The Part argues that
the use of task-relevant knowledge and memory is not restricted to
creative activities (such as ideas, processes, and methods) that are
not afforded protection under copyright law and are therefore free
to be used for further creative activities. Rather, task-relevant
knowledge and memory also include concrete expressions that are
stored in the author’s memory as part of his visual, semantic, and
symbolic knowledge. Consequently, the use of expression as a basis
for creative activity is not qualitatively different from the use of
mere ideas under the cognitive understanding of the creative
process. Both elements are an inherent part of the creative
204
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process.205 This observation has significant implications for copyright law, especially the derivative work right.
As emphasized in the introduction, the tension between the use
of task-relevant knowledge and memory in the creative process and
the derivative work right does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that authors should be deprived of an exclusive right to their
derivative works. Nevertheless, copyright law’s distinction between ideas and expressions is not justified by the theoretical underpinnings of creativity because there is a mismatch between the
legal norm and the cognitive understanding of creativity. Accordingly, the legal profession should question whether the law should
bridge this gap and fully mirror the cognitive understanding of
creativity. It is also important to note that it may be that the creative process is affected by external factors such as culture, economy, religion, and the law. This Article does not argue that the cognitive process of creation is a closed and fixed system; it argues that
to the extent the law affects creativity, as may happen due the existing mismatch presented here, it is important to ask whether this
effect is desired and justified.
A. Theoretical Analysis of the Use of Knowledge and Memory
In their work, Runco and Chand dedicated a vast discussion to
the role of knowledge and memory in creativity.206 As for knowledge, they suggested a distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge.207 Procedural knowledge refers to familiarity with
strategies by which certain task-related processes could be accomplished (i.e., know-how).208 When an author chooses a useful strategy, procedural knowledge has a significant contribution to creativity.209 In a series of studies, Runco, Chand, and their collaborators
tested the effect of procedural knowledge on creativity.210 The researchers divided participants into two groups and gave each group
205

It is important to note that copyright law permits the use of another’s expressions in
certain circumstances, such as under the fair use doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
206
See Runco & Chand, supra note 74, at 245–46, 249.
207
See id. at 246.
208
See id.
209
See id.
210
See id. at 246–47.

322

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:287

the same task.211 One group received general guidelines about how
to accomplish the task, while the other group received explicit directions for achieving the task.212 The studies revealed not only
that explicit directions lead to greater innovation, but also that procedural knowledge may overcome thought fixation at the ideation
stage of creativity.213
Declarative knowledge, on the other hand, refers to factual information stored in the author’s memory.214 Runco and Chand
theorized that declarative knowledge contributes to the creative
process by supplying the necessary information for the creation of
ideas.215 Support for this theory is found in historical studies that
show the need to acquire expertise in a field before achieving substantial creative accomplishments.216 Runco and Chand argued that
declarative knowledge directly affects the ideation stage because an
author with greater task-relevant expertise has a wider set of tools
to develop preliminary ideas.217 For example, they argued that
when a person is asked to engage in an open task that includes
round objects, he will have an advantage if his expertise includes
knowledge of round things, such as an astronomer who knows the
general features of planets or a biologist who understands molecules or cells.218 They also emphasized that declarative knowledge
is mainly experience-based but could be achieved by relevant environmental cues.219
Additionally, Runco and Chand explained that both procedural
and declarative knowledge are stored in long-term memory, which
211
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can be accessed at any moment in order to engage with a task.220
However, they noted that merely accessing procedural and declarative knowledge would likely lead to an unoriginal and uncreative
product.221 They posited that the memory in which knowledge is
stored could be divided into two types: episodic, defined as a detailed memory of an experience, and semantic, defined as a memory that contains only general characteristics of the relevant experience.222 Semantic memory is especially relevant to the creative
process because it contains “gaps” and therefore does not allow a
full reproduction of a relevant experience.223 Thus, semantic memory allows an author to restore parts of a specific experience and
reconstruct other parts to engage in a relevant task.224 Runco and
Chand argued that such reconstruction of memory is a creative activity.225 It is important to clarify once again that declarative knowledge consists of concrete instances, and, in this sense, includes
both ideas and expressions in copyright terms. The result of the
reflection on explicit artistic expressions, as part of an experience
that is stored in the author’s memory, while restoring it and reconstructing it may be an example of a derivative work in the legal
sense.
In fact, Runco and Chand explained that creative thinking is
memory-based.226 They relied on scholars Pat Langley and Randolph Jones, who argued that knowledge assists creativity by allowing its restoration thought indexes created for each creativedomain.227 Langley and Jones explained:
Humans possess no general creativity factor; so no
such component exists to be measured. Instead,
220
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humans possess a wealth of knowledge structures
indexed by concepts that a person judges as important. The level of creativity that one exhibits will
depend on one’s knowledge, one’s indexing
scheme, and the particular situation in which one
finds oneself.228
Runco and Chand’s account of the use of prior knowledge and
memory in the creative process is also backed by additional theoretic literature. Roger Schank, an American cognitive psychologist
who focuses on artificial intelligence and creativity, described in his
knowledge structure model that when an author encounters a cognitive input, he processes it in light of his existing knowledge structures and that input is embedded into memory in a way that allows
future access.229 Dynamic memory, according to Schank, refines
this process when inputs are received in the author’s memory that
relate to existing knowledge structures or past experiences.230
Thus, an author’s prior experiences alter the author’s knowledge
structure.231 Accordingly, the author’s ability to understand new
phenomena and problems in the world is based on a dynamic memory loaded with knowledge of prior experiences. When an author is
required to engage with a task, he uses prior knowledge structures
and experiences to detect what Schank refers to as an “explanation
pattern” that the author used in the past.232 Schank also argued
that the creative process is characterized by two sub-processes.233
The first is the search for a possible explanation pattern, and the
second is an adaptation process in which the explanation pattern is
restored from memory and adapted so that it is compatible with the
relevant task.234 The emphasis on the adaptation and restructuring
as a basis for creativity is evident here as well.235 This theoretical
228
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approach could apply to both the adaptation and restructuring of
expressions and ideas that are part of an author’s knowledge base.
Both types of knowledge could be part of the cognitive process of
creativity.
American psychologist Robert J. Sternberg also empathized the
role of knowledge and memory in creativity in his three-facet model to creativity.236 He referred to the components of knowledge acquisition in the process of creation and their effect on creative illumination.237 Of the three potential causes for illumination presented, two refer to processes similar to those discussed thus far.
One cause, according to Sternberg, is “selective combination,” in
which illumination is created due to a synthesis between separate
pieces of stored information.238 The ability to perform such a
process depends on the author’s prior knowledge—the wider the
knowledge pool, the greater variety of combinations.
Additionally, Sternberg referred to “selective comparison,”
which compares new information to preexisting knowledge and its
characteristics to understand and use the new information.239 He
argued that problem solving by analogy is one example of this cause
of illumination.240 Paul J. Locher, a professor of experimental psychology, reached similar conclusions.241 He reviewed empirical and
historical studies on the process of creation, such as brain imaging,
X-ray studies of artworks, and archival studies on the creation of
historical masterpieces in real time.242 Based on these studies,
Locher argued that the use of procedural and declarative knowledge is essential and central to all stages of the creative process.243
Sternberg’s emphasis on the importance of synthesis between existing knowledge components in the process of creation, along with
Locher’s focus on the importance of declarative knowledge (which
236
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includes both ideas and expression) to the creative process support
the argument that no qualitative distinction between ideas and expressions exists.
B. Empirical Studies on Creativity
American creativity researchers Wayne Baughman and Michael
Mumford assumed in their studies that merely restoring an application of prior experiences and knowledge by the author is not likely
to lead to creativity.244 However, they argued that combining and
restructuring existing knowledge is a good mechanism for ideation.245 This argument was based on several studies showing that
creative development in many fields requires the combination and
restructuring of existing knowledge.246 They referred to the research of Michele Mobley (and his co-authors), who argued that it
is impossible to create something from nothing and that a generation of new ideas has to be based on existing knowledge structures.247 Mobley hypothesized that if authors are asked to combine
diverse categories, their creative products will be more original.248
To test this theory, 160 participants were asked to work with exemplars of various categories, to combine them in order to create
new categories, and to suggest new exemplars for the new categories and write a story that describes them.249 They found more originality when participants combined more distant categories, but
the results also demonstrated that the quality of the products declined when participants worked with distant categories, which was
likely due to difficulties that arose when working with unknown
categories.250

244

See Wayne A. Baughman & Michael D. Mumford, Process-Analytic Models of Creative
Capacities: Operations Influencing the Combination-and-Reorganization Process, 8
CREATIVITY RES. J. 37, 38 (1995).
245
See id.
246
See id.
247
See id. at 39 (citing Michele I. Mobley et al., Process Analytic Models of Creative
Capacities: Evidence for the Combination and Reorganization Process, 5 CREATIVITY RES. J.
125 (1992)).
248
See id. (citing Mobley et al., supra note 247).
249
See id. at 39–40 (citing Mobley et al., supra note 247).
250
See id. at 40 (citing Mobley et al., supra note 247).

2017]

RECREATING COPYRIGHT

327

Following Mobley, Baughman and Mumford conducted the following study: 155 participants were given exemplars of undefined
categories.251 They were first asked to identify each category according to the exemplars provided.252 They were then asked to
create a category that united all the categories mapped by them and
to find an exemplar for the united category.253 Finally, the participants were asked to define the new category and to find more exemplars for it.254 Analyzing the findings, Baughman and Mumford
concluded that, under some conditions, tasks involving the combination of categories lead to better and more original creative products.255 In addition, they noted that the process of combination and
reorganization is executed by searching for the characteristics of
each category and mapping them, and that only a combination of
the two would lead to greater originality.256
Finke, Ward, and Smith conducted a line of similar studies focusing on a combination and reorganization of the categories and
the importance of exemplars.257 They focused on the effects that
categories and known perceptions have on the creative process.258
This was based on the perception that new ideas, as creative as
they may be, are usually developed as limited expansions of existing perceptions.259 Their first study, conducted in 1994, consisted
of five experiments.260 In the first experiment, thirty-seven participants were asked to draw an animal they may encounter on a different planet, another animal from the same species, and an animal
from the same planet but from a different species.261 The results
showed that the vast majority of animals drawn had earthy features
(bilateral symmetry, sensory organs, limbs, etc.), which shows that
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when an author is asked to create an exemplar for a known category, his work will be highly structured.262
In their second experiment, 180 participants were asked to
draw an animal residing on a different planet that is completely different than earth.263 The participants were divided into four
groups; one group did not receive any guidance, and the other
group was instructed that the animal had either feathers, fur, or
lives underwater.264 This experiment also indicated that there is
significant use of prior knowledge of the characteristics of a category in the process of finding a new exemplar for the category.265
That is why participants in the feathers group tended to draw
winged animals, and participants in the underwater group tended
to draw animals with fins.266 Similarly, participants in the fur and
feather groups tended to draw animals with two feet and participants in the feathers group tended to draw animals with a beak.267
Three additional experiments also produced results showing that
participants usually restore known exemplars of earthy animals
when asked to draw imaginary animals.268
Based on these findings, Finke, Ward, and Smith proposed the
term “structured imagination” to describe an author’s tendency to
create new ideas while preserving existing categories and noted:
“Imagination is structured or directed by knowledge of the category or categories most related to the individual’s goals.”269 Later,
Finke, Ward, and Smith explained that the use of knowledge in this
context refers to both long-tem memory and to knowledge gathered
during engagement with the relevant task.270 To describe the
process in which the author uses preexisting knowledge structures,
Finke, Ward, and Smith proposed the “path of least resistance”
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See id. at 8–11.
See id. at 12.
See id.
See id. at 13–18.
See id. at 13.
See id. at 13–14.
See id. at 22–23, 26–28, 30.
Id. at 31.
See Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 198.
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model.271 They postulated that when an author imagines a new entity, she first determines the task-relevant knowledge-domain, and
then accesses the existing knowledge in that domain to construct a
new entity.272
Thomas Ward, a cognition and creativity researcher, and Yuliya Kolomyts, a language researcher, both of the University of Alabama, expanded this model and noted that when authors develop
new ideas in a specific domain, their first inclination is to access
specific exemplars from this domain as a starting point, retrieve
characteristics from these exemplars, and then import them into
developing ideas.273 This is based on empirical findings of Ward
and his followers, which suggested that to develop an exemplar for
a new domain, authors develop products that are substantially similar to exemplars of existing domains.274 It is likely that this tendency is an inherent part of structured imagination.275 Notably, Ward
theorized that the probability of innovative creativity is higher
when the author uses larger systems of knowledge instead of mere
exemplars.276 However, Ward and Kolomyts emphasized that,
while using more abstract ideas would probably lead to more creativity, it would come at the expense of compatibility and usability of
the creative products and thus diminish their value.277 Therefore, it
should be expected that the “constraining” effect that reliance on
prior knowledge and exemplars has on innovation is necessary to
reach meaningful and valuable creative products.278
The studies discussed in this Article thus far focus on creative
thought, generally, and all fields of creative activity—not only
those to which copyright law applies.279 There are very few empiri271

See id.; see also Ward, supra note 260, at 35; Thomas B. Ward, What’s Old About New
Ideas?, in THE CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH 157, 174 (Steven M. Smith, Thomas B.
Ward, & Ronald A. Finke eds., 1995).
272
See sources cited supra note 271.
273
See Ward & Kolomyts, supra note 197, at 100.
274
See id. at 99.
275
See id.
276
See Ward, supra note 260, at 36.
277
See Ward & Kolomyts, supra note 197, at 100.
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See id. at 101.
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It is important to note that the theoretical literature on cognitive psychology does
not distinguish between works of authorship, inventions, and abstract creative thought.
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cal studies that focus directly on artworks and other works of authorship. Nevertheless, there are numerous studies relevant to this
Article’s discussion that examine the process of making works of
art. Japanese cognitive psychologists Sawako Yokochi and Takeshi
Okada attempted to empirically test different theoretical approaches to creativity by studying the process of creating artworks.280 For
this purpose, they observed Chinese Suibokuga, a traditional painter in his sixties with twenty years of experience, for a three-year
period.281 The painter was asked to draw eight paintings on an
empty canvas and eight additional paintings on a canvas containing
fifteen random lines drawn by two other participants.282 Yokochi
and Okada identified two important characteristics in these studies:
First, when the painter worked with the empty canvas, he used the
same painting strategy every time.283 Second, when the painter
worked with predetermined random lines, his paintings were less
accurate in their composition but much more original in their
style.284 This observation was corroborated by interviews with the
painter after the study.285 The researchers concluded, based on this
findings, that the approach of Finke, Ward, and Smith was accurate
and that combining preexisting knowledge structures containing
components from past experiences contributes significantly to innovation.286
Another qualitative study conducted by cognitive psychologists
Mary-Anne Mace and Tony Ward attempted to develop a model
for the creative process behind artworks.287 They conducted semi-

This does not diminish the applicability of these theories to creative activities governed by
copyright law.
280
See Sawako Yokochi & Takeshi Okada, Creative Cognitive Process of Art Making: A
Field Study of a Traditional Chinese Ink Painter, 17 CREATIVITY RES. J. 241, 241 (2005).
281
See id. at 243.
282
See id.
283
See id. at 244–45. The researchers noted that in fifteen out of the sixteen paintings
the painter started drawing a tree and only later added other objects. Id.
284
See id. at 247.
285
See id.
286
See id. at 250; see also Ward, Smith & Finke, supra note 123, at 192.
287
See Mary-Anne Mace & Tony Ward, Modeling the Creative Process: A Grounded
Theory Analysis of Creativity in the Domain of Art Making, 14 CREATIVITY RES. J. 179, 180
(2002).
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structured interviews with authors during the creative process.288
At the first stage, sixteen visual artists were interviewed at three
different times during their creative process—first, at the beginning of the process, second, in the middle of the it, and third at the
end of the process.289 The participants were asked to describe their
creative process at the relevant stage of the interview and to refrain
from reporting general theories about the creative process.290 After
analyzing the findings, the researchers proposed a detailed model
for the creation of artworks based on the interviews.291 According
to Mace and Ward, the creation of a work of art does not develop
out of a conceptual void; rather, it is a product of thought and ongoing experience.292 They argued that the author obtains a vast
knowledge base of the creative process over time, explicitly and
implicitly understanding techniques, skills, genres, theories, aesthetics, prior works, and art in its contemporary and historical
sense.293 This knowledge develops along with the process of creation, and the author refers to it at every stage of the process.294
They later verified the results of this study.295 It is important to
note that Mace and Ward explicitly emphasized that the creative
process is also based on explicit knowledge of prior works that the
author refers to during the process.296 They also stressed that this
aspect links the process of creating a current work with previous
and future works in the same domain.297 In this sense, it is clear
that the process of creation includes the use of expressions as well
as ideas.298
In the past three decades, the number of quantitative empirical
studies of creativity using methodologies and instruments from
neurosciences has grown tremendously. The two main methodologies in this field are the use of functional magnetic resonance imag288
289
290
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ing (“fMRI”) and an electroencephalogram (“EEG”).299 One example of such a study was American cognitive psychologist Robert
L. Solso, who examined the creative process in real-time using
fMRI.300 Solso measured the brain activity of British portrait artist
Humphrey Ocean while he drew portraits of figures that were presented to him, and compared it to the brain activity of another amateur participant performing the same task.301 The two participants
were asked to draw the faces of presented figures for thirty seconds
while undergoing fMRI.302
The results of the study showed excessive activity in the rightrear part of the amateur participant’s brain when compared to
Ocean’s.303 According to Solso, this showed that Ocean’s experience and expertise in face-detection and understanding may have
led to less effort in the parts of the brain charged with facedetection.304 The more interesting result, however, was that
Ocean’s brain showed excessive activity in the front-central part of
the right lobe, which is in charge of associative thinking and manipulation of visual structures.305 According to Solso, this indicated
that, while the amateur participant reproduced the figures presented to him, Ocean thought about them and associatively
adapted them.306
In a different fMRI study conducted by cognition and brain
scientist Melissa Ellamil (and her co-authors), fifteen visual art
students were presented with short book descriptions and asked to
299

See Keith Sawyer, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Creativity: A Critical Review, 23
CREATIVITY RES. J. 137, 138–40 (2011). An fMRI uses magnetic traits of oxygenated blood
cells in comparison with un-oxygenated cells to examine which parts of the brain are
active at a specific time. The technique produces an image portraying the difference
between the oxygenation levels of different blood cells and shows a model-based image of
the active parts of the brain during the sample. An EEG measures electromagnetic pulses
created by the activity of neurons in the brain cortex by placing electrodes on the scalp of
the participant. Id.
300
See Robert L. Solso, Brain Activities in a Skilled Versus a Novice Artist: An fMRI
Study, 34 LEONARDO 31, 33 (2001).
301
See id.
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See id. at 33–34.
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draw illustrations for each book’s cover on a tablet computer connected to fMRI.307 Later, they were asked to review their illustrations and evaluate them.308 The researchers noted that at the production stage of the illustrations, excessive brain action occurred in
the medial temporal lobe, which is in charge of the processing of
semantic memory and recombination of memory using associations.309 The researchers explained that this finding fits theoretical
approaches that focus on associative processing and recombination
of existing knowledge as the basis for creativity.310
Studies using the EEG methodology have also validated some
of the theoretical approaches to creativity concerning the use of
task-relevant knowledge and memory.311 Austrian cognitive psychologists Andreas Fink and Mathias Benedek reviewed many
EEG studies that focused on creativity.312 Among other findings,
they concluded that all studies showed changes in alpha power in
the author’s brain cortex during creative activity.313 One of the
consistent changes that Fink and Benedek identified was an increase in alpha power in the rear part of the parietal lobe of the
brain cortex.314 They surmised that because this part of the brain is
in charge of memory, the increase in alpha power should be unders-
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See Melissa Ellamil et al., Evaluative and Generative Modes of Thought During the
Creative Process, 59 NEUROIMAGE 1783, 1784–85 (2012).
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See id. at 1785.
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See id. at 1786, 1791.
310
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brain activity in the medial temporal lobe, see Huimin Zheng, Jiayi Luo & RongjunYu,
From Memory to Prospection: What Are the Overlapping and the Distinct Components Between
Remembering and Imagining?, 5 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2014).
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44 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 111, 111 (2014).
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tood as an attempt to search and restore memory in order to use
and recombine knowledge for the creative process.315
Despite the differences in the various neuroscientific studies of
creativity, many researchers reached similar conclusions about the
use of task-relevant knowledge and memory in the creative process.
American creativity researcher Keith Sawyer, for example, reviewed the studies published in this field between October 2010
and May 2011.316 Although he urged psychologists to think critically about the use of neuroscience in creativity studies and to understand the shortcomings, he nevertheless concluded that there are a
number of areas where the results are undisputed.317 For instance,
he emphasized that associative thinking—the recombination of
preexisting knowledge and task-relevant expertise—is an undisputed part of creativity.318 In a different literature review, cognitive
psychologists Sureyya Yoruk and Mark Runco examined fMRI and
EEG studies conducted from 2004 to 2014.319 They concluded that
creativity is characterized by excessive brain activity in the left part
of the brain, specifically in the lower parietal lobe, which is in
charge of storing semantic memory.320 In addition, they argued that
these areas of the brain are in charge of creating preliminary associations that function as a step toward more distant associations that
develop in the right hemisphere of the brain where EEG studies
show excessive alpha power.321 Therefore, they concluded that
creativity is characterized by the processing and recombination of
semantic memory and task-relevant knowledge contained within
such processing.322
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C. Historical Studies
One of the methodologies used in creativity studies is archival
research, which examines the creation of works of art by reviewing
the personal documents made by artists while they created masterpieces.323 This Section focuses on the studies conducted by Robert
Weisberg, a cognitive psychologist focusing on creativity, geniality,
and expertise who shed light on the importance of expertise and
task-relevant knowledge to the creative process from a historical
perspective.
Weisberg’s first two case studies are from the field of visual
arts, specifically, masterpieces of Pablo Picasso.324 The first work is
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon published in 1907.325 Weisberg analyzed
the creative process of this work by comparing X-ray images of the
final product to sketches preserved by Picasso.326 Weisberg described the various stages in Picasso’s work as well as the parts in
which Picasso used prior works.327 However, the most important
observation for this Article’s purposes is the identification of external sources of Picasso’s work.328 Weisberg learned that the nude
female figures in Picasso’s work were based on and adapted from
figures included in other painters’ masterpieces.329 For example,
the kneeling female in the bottom-right part of Picasso’s painting is
very similar to the female in Paul Cezanne’s work entitled The
Three Bathers.330 In addition, the two central female figures in Picasso’s work are similar to the two women who appear in Goya’s
Nuda Maja and Manet’s Olympia.331 The general composition of
Picasso’s work is drawn from his colleague Henri Matisse’s work,
Le Bonheur de Vivre.332
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Weisberg conducted similar research regarding Picasso’s masterpiece Guernica.333 He explained that this work is substantially
based on previous works of Picasso.334 But, more importantly,
Weisberg also noted that Guernica, which referred to the atrocities
of the Spanish civil war, was substantially based on Goya’s series of
sketches entitled The Disasters of War from 1816.335 Weisberg emphasized that several figures and positions presented in Goya’s
sketches appear, after stylistic adaptations, in Picasso’s Guernica.336
Weisberg found similar findings in musical compositions.337 He
studied many of the early works of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and
found significant reliance on other composers’ works.338 For instance, Mozart’s first four piano concerti (K. 37, 29, 40, 41) did not
contain any original music—they were adapted from the works of
five other composers.339 In addition, Mozart’s three consecutive
piano concerti (K. 107 nos. 1–3) composed in 1772 were actually
the works of Johann Christian Bach (Johan Sebastian Bach’s
younger son) and were rearranged and orchestrated by Mozart.340
A similar pattern was identified in Mozart’s first symphonies and
chamber compositions, which were stylized according to preclassical styles and based on the compositions of young Bach and
other German composers.341 Likewise, Weisberg found reliance on
prior works in Mozart’s later compositions.342 He argued that the
finale of Mozart’s Jupiter symphony—the last that Mozart composed—was based on five themes that were drawn from other
composers’ work.343 Similarly, Mozart’s three E-flat horn concerti
was substantially based on Antoni Rosetti’s horn concerti from the
same period.344
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Weisberg divided his studies into two categories of creativity.
He described the first as reproductive creativity.345 The category
includes the Guernica, the structure of which Picasso based on his
previous works.346 Weisberg noted that these cases show this type
of creativity occurs through the reproduction of prior knowledge
without modifying its form and by adapting it to fit new needs
through analogical transfer.347 Weisberg described the second type
of creativity as reproductive restructuring.348 An example of this is
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, which is speculated to have
been substantially restructured after Picasso visited an ethnographic museum and encountered primitive sculpture.349 Weisberg inferred from these case studies that every work is linked to prior
work and that every work has a preceding work, as the past is a crucial basis for innovation.350 In light of these observations, Weisberg
proposed a model that explains the use of task-relevant knowledge
in creativity.351 In contrast to the notion that creativity begins with
the reception of input from the environment that is later processed
according to stored knowledge (bottom-up model), he contended
that task-relevant knowledge forms the perception of input from
the environment (top-down model).352 Thus, when a person identifies a new event in the environment, the mere identification is governed by the preexisting task-relevant knowledge already stored in
his memory, which further evidences task-relevant knowledge’s
critical contribution to creativity.353
The studies presented in this Part—theoretical, empirical, and
historical—all point to the same conclusion: They all focus, in one
way or another, on the significant role task-relevant knowledge and
345

See Robert W. Weisberg, Case Studies of Creative Thinking: Reproduction Versus
Restructuring in the Real World, in THE CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH, supra note 271,
at 53, 57–62.
346
See id. at 57–58.
347
See id. at 61–62.
348
See id. at 63–69.
349
See id. at 63–65.
350
See WEISBERG, supra note 33, at 112–13. This notion is an explicit expression of the
idea of progress in copyright law and is directly related to the difficulties with the current
definition of the derivative work right.
351
See id. at 114–18.
352
See id.
353
See id.

338

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:287

memory have in the cognitive process of creation and describe in
different ways how these components are used by the author.
These studies all show that the creative process includes the use of
existing knowledge structures inherently and in a concrete way that
is identifiable in different stages of the process and its outcomes.
The use of knowledge structures is not limited to ideas (in copyright terms); it also includes the explicit use of expressions. Under
this reading of the cognitive psychology literature on creativity,
there is no qualitative difference between creative activities based
upon ideas and those based on explicit expressions. The products
of both are considered creative under these approaches. This is the
main notion that this Article tries to extract from the cognitive psychology discourse on creativity. The next Part explains how this
notion can be applied to copyright law and what implications it may
have on different copyright doctrines.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW
After establishing the notion that the creative process is characterized by two main processes—one of unfocused thought and
generation of abstract ideas and the other of focused thought and
crystallization of abstract ideas—and showing that the use of knowledge and memory (not limited to ideas but also to explicit expressions) is an inherent part of the creative process, this Part points
out the implications of these notions on some aspects of copyright
law and examines to what extent the legal doctrine matches the
cognitive understanding of creativity. The Part argues that this notion has significant implications for copyright law’s originality requirement, derivative work right, and idea/expression dichotomy.
A. The Use of Prior Knowledge in the Creative Process and Copyright’s
Originality Requirement
The originality requirement is at the heart of copyright and
aims to ensure that non-original works do not receive copyright
protection.354 The originality requirement is part of copyright’s
statutory requirements in many jurisdictions but “originality” is
354

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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not statutorily defined.355 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act
states that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works . . . .”356 Courts in many jurisdictions have
struggled with defining the exact meaning of originality for copyright purposes. In the notorious Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co. case, the Supreme Court ruled that in order to
prove originality for copyright purposes, a work should be an independent creation of the author and should be somewhat creative.357
The ruling did not end the debate on the meaning of originality and
creativity in copyright law.358 Without delving into the various approaches to creativity and originality in copyright law, it seems that
one definition is not in dispute—for a work or any part of it to be
original, it must be the author’s independent creation.359
If originality, in its undisputed meaning, is the sine qua non for
copyright protection, the importance of reliance on prior knowledge and memory in the process of creation has significant implications for the requirement. If this Article’s argument is correct, it
is likely that every author’s work is based on components (including expressions) from other authors’ works. Further, if an author’s
work is based on another author’s expression, then it may, under
certain circumstances, be a derivative work.360 Conversely, if a
work is based on ideas or unprotected expression, then it is an
“original work.”361 As a result, many works of authorship are not
copyrightable and remain in the public domain. Courts sometimes
indeed distinguish between different components of a work that are
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copyrightable and those that are not.362 Nevertheless, the discourse
in copyright law and specifically in court decisions is about the copyrightabilty of a work as a whole.363 The notions in this Article
indicate that this may not be the right question to ask and that
courts should instead ask what components of the work are copyrightable.
This Article emphasizes the mismatch between the legal doctrine and the cognitive understanding of creativity. In the context
of the originality requirement, there is a match as far as the principles of the doctrine are considered but a mismatch as to its application in courts. The few doubts raised here articulate the potential
contribution that notions from cognitive psychology of creativity
may have for copyright law.
B. The Creative Process and the Author’s Independent Contribution
Commentators such as James Boyle, Jessica Litman, and R.
Keith Sawyer argue that copyright law perceives creativity from a
“romantic” point of view attributed to the western world.364 This
romantic point of view understands creativity as a moment of revelation in which a work is created from nothing—a light bulb moment—and portrays the author as an independent individual working in the dark until the awaited breakthrough.365
362

See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating
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Many scholars criticize the romantic approach to creativity.
The first stage of the criticism relied on the common notion that no
work could be created out of nothing and that it is obvious that one
needs to rely on prior knowledge to innovate.366 This notion was so
obvious to critical scholars that some of them referred to it as a
cliché.367 Kwall suggested, however, that in spite of the fact that
every work is based on previous knowledge, the individual contribution of the author to new work still justifies copyright protection.368 Nevertheless, it seems that the romantic approach to authorship has lost credit, at least in academic scholarship for the last
two decades. It also seems that this intuitive notion is becoming
more substantial as knowledge becomes more and more available
and technological advancements make it more accessible and usable for further innovation.369
In their important and constitutive book, which was the first to
offer an alternative to the romantic author approach to copyright
law, Martha Woodmansee, a professor of English literature, and
Peter Jaszi, an acclaimed copyright scholar, showed that the legal
norms in copyright law are a product of the romantic author approach and are not compatible with the social understanding of
creativity.370 Woodmansee showed that the romantic author approach is a product of the eighteenth century and is a short episode
in comparison to the documented history of creativity in earlier
centuries, and that, in the past, the creative process was perceived
as a social action that is not attributed to one individual.371 On the
366
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basis of these notions, Jaszi argued that the influence of the romantic author approach on copyright law led to a gap between the social understanding of creativity and the legal one, which makes it
difficult for copyright law to adapt and govern more complex models of creativity and specifically multiple-authorship works.372
The notions from the cognitive psychology of creativity as presented in this Article show that this understanding of creativity
leads to a somewhat different conclusion. Although the cognitive
process of creation is characterized by substantial reliance on prior
task-relevant knowledge and memory, an inseparable part of creativity has to do with the unfocused thought of the author and cognitive processes that are original to him.373 Therefore, it seems that
the creative process is not a romantic individual process in the
sense that the author is the sole origin of the work, but, on the other hand, it is not based solely on prior knowledge and works. In
fact, there is a significant match between copyright’s originality
requirement and the cognitive understanding of creativity that articulates the author’s original contribution. These notions could be
the basis for further discussion of the place of the individual author
in the process of creation and in copyright law.
One example of the implications of such a discussion is the
joint authorship doctrine in copyright law. Section 201(a) of the
Copyright Act states that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.”374 A “joint work” is defined as
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.”375 One of the most debated aspects about
this doctrine revolves around what contribution to a joint work is
considered authorship. The two main positions were argued by
copyright scholars Melville Nimmer, who asserted that the contri372
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in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 370, at 29 [hereinafter Jaszi, Author Effect]; Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L. J. 455 (1991)
[hereinafter Jaszi, Theory of Copyright].
373
See Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 372; Jaszi, Theory of Copyright, supra note 372.
374
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
375
Id. § 101.

2017]

RECREATING COPYRIGHT

343

bution does not have to be copyrightable on its own,376 and Paul
Goldstein, who argued that the contribution should be independently copyrightable.377
The findings from the cognitive psychology of creativity may
offer guidance here. If the process of creation involves independent
contribution of the author, and the process does not make a distinction between ideas and expressions, there is no reason to think that
an independent contribution to a work of authorship—which consists of ideas and is therefore not copyrightable on its own—is not a
creative contribution that amounts to authorship. Thus, Nimmer’s
claim that non-copyrightable contributions to a work of authorship
could qualify as joint authorship may fit well with the understanding of creativity.378
C. The Use of Prior Knowledge and the Right to Make Derivative
Works
The right to make derivative works is a relatively new right in
copyright law’s bundle of rights and was first introduced in the
Copyright Act of 1976.379 It expanded the preexisting adaptation
right and absorbed the case law’s expansion of the reproduction
right.380 The derivative work right granted authors exclusive rights
to works that are “based upon one or more preexisting works, such
376

See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[A][3]
(2015). Nimmer’s approach was explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit in Childress v.
Taylor and later in the Ninth Circuit as well. Id. (citing 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991)).
The Seventh Circuit, however, accepted Nimmer’s approach and decided that the
contribution of ideas could be sufficient for joint authorship. See id.
377
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.1, at 4:7 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supp. 2007). Goldstein’s approach was followed in the Childress case and in subsequent
cases in the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
378
For an analysis of different tests for the constitution of joint authorship that attempts
to solve the problems with the intent requirement based on notions from creativity
studies, see Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 357–61 (2010). Mandel
contends that the requirement for joint authorship would be a “non-market-substitutablecontribution.” Id.
379
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
380
See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 224–33 (2008); Goldstein, supra
note 366, at 211–15; Jed Rubinfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1, 49–52 (2002).
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as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”381 With regard to the application of the current doctrine, Nimmer argued that the right to make
derivative works is “superfluous” because the making of a derivative work will (almost) always involve reproduction of the underlying work;382 however, Professor Pamela Samuelson argued that the
derivative work right could be understood in a different way that
could exist independently from the reproduction right.383 On the
normative level, however, most commentators have argued that the
current, broad definition of the derivative work right is unjustified.384
The derivative work right’s current definition raises significant
questions and difficulties, which focus mainly on the tension between first and second authors, and on the constraints that the
right casts on the development of new expressions. The difficulties
involve two different aspects of the derivative work right. The first
aspect is the scope of the right in light of its statutory definition.
This aspect is substantial because it caps the borders of the legal
discourse on derivative works and sets its start and end points and
381

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 376, § 8.09[A][1].
383
See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L. J. 1505 (2013).
384
For a critique of the derivative work right based on freedom of speech, see Christina
Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Work Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth
and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 688 (2010); Niva ElkinKoren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace,
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 277–83 (1996); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–64 (1996); Voegtli, supra note 369, at
1213–58. For an economic critique on the derivative work right, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Shubha
Ghosh, Market Entry and the Proper Scope of Copyright, 12 INT’L J. ECON. & BUS. 347, 351
(2005); Goldstein, supra note 366, at 227; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048–68 (1997); Lydia Pallas Loren, The
Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 77–78 (2000); Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining Copyright’s
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 650–53 (1996); Chris Newman,
Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2011); Stewart
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215–17 (1996);
Voegtli, supra note 369, at 1241–45.
382
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the number of cases to which it applies. The second aspect concerns remedies for copyright infringement. This aspect determines
the right’s strength to a great extent—that is, the stronger the remedies granted to the copyright holder (or the prohibition on
whoever is not), the stronger the right, and vice versa.
In the absence of empirical data that could offer guidance, at
least on a utilitarian basis, as to the proper balance between first
authors’ interests and second authors’ interests, it is possible to
turn to findings from cognitive psychology’s account of creativity.385 Moreover, as a recent study shows, there is good reason to
doubt whether authors are in fact rational agents that respond to
market incentives. Based on behavioral experiments, Stephan
Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco, and Christopher Sprigman
showed that authors’ decision to borrow from existing works or
create works “from scratch” is not affected by copyright law’s incentives, but by their subjective belief about the difficulty of innovation.386 These findings emphasize the importance of understanding cognitive psychology’s account of creativity and applying it to
the law in order to create more efficient copyright doctrines. The
notion regarding the use of prior knowledge and memory in the
creative process and the lack of qualitative differences between
ideas and expressions in this context warrant asking whether copyright law’s distinction between derivative and original works is justified.
As far as the first aspect is concerned—the scope of the derivative work right—there is a strong link between the legal norm and
the cognitive understanding of creativity. If, for example, it turned
out that the scope of the derivative work right is very broad, but the
reliance on expressions during the process of creation is marginal,
it would raise the question of whether such a legal right is needed
and justified. In contrast, if the scope of the derivative work right is
narrow, vague, and applied to a limited set of cases, but the use of
preexisting expressions is inherent to the process of creation (as
385

For a similar approach, see Fishman, supra note 2, at 1341, and Jeanna C. Former, A
Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1458–59 (2010).
386
See Stephan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND.
L. REV. 1251, 1297 (2016).

346

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:287

this Article attempts to show), scholars should ask whether the legal doctrine should better reflect the behavioral aspects of creativity.
But, more important, due to the significance of the use of prior
knowledge and memory in the cognitive process of creation (which
is not limited to ideas but also includes explicit expressions), a better understanding of the right to make derivative works is warranted. The making of a derivative work is, in its nature, a creative
activity under cognitive approaches to creativity and is not qualitatively different than an original work (that is not based on protected
expressions). This observation has great importance as far as the
scope of the derivative right and its intersection with the reproduction right are concerned. This Article argues that the reproduction
right should apply only to mere reproductions, which are inherently uncreative and therefore qualitatively different from derivative
or original works.387
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Assuming that the literary masterpiece The Catcher in the Rye388 is an
original work that is creative under copyright law, there are three
different alternatives for works based on this work. One alternative
is the making of a literary work whose main character is a sixteenyear-old teenager who runs away from home to the big city and
reaches important notions about the life of adults during his journey. This work would probably be considered original under copyright law because it only uses the general underlying idea in the
original work, and would also be considered creative under the
cognitive approaches presented above. Another alternative is the
making of a literary work entitled “60 Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye,” which presents the relationship between Mr.
C. (a reference to Holden Caulfield) and the 90-year-old author
387

A reservation is appropriate here. There obviously are reproductive actions, in
copyright terms, that use explicit copyrighted expressions without adding original
expressions to them which are very creative in the cognitive behavioral sense. One
example is the use of an expression while changing its mode of presentation or presenting
it in a different context that gives it new meaning. These activities are typically allowed
under the fair use doctrine. This Article does not focus on the interrelations between fair
use and reproduction, but it seems that the fair use doctrine sufficiently accounts for the
cognitive notions regarding the creativity of such activities.
388
See generally J.D. SALINGER, CATCHER IN THE RYE (Little, Brown & Co. 1951).
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who created his character and refers to specific scenes from the
original work.389 This work would fall under the category of derivative works because it uses explicit expression from the original
work and contributes additional originality. It would also be considered creative under the cognitive approaches that view the recombination of prior knowledge as part of creativity. A third alternative would be a literal repeat of the original work’s text while
changing the name of the main character Holden Caulfield to
James Sheffield. Under copyright law, this is considered a reproduction despite the marginal changes. In contrast to the two first
alternatives, the third option is not considered creative under the
cognitive approaches because it is an exact restoration of knowledge without any other creative components.
This example illustrates the gap between the legal categories
and the cognitive understanding of creativity. The cognitive psychology approaches do not distinguish between knowledge types
such as ideas or expressions as a basis for creativity. They also do
not distinguish between the uses of different knowledge types along
the timeline of creativity—meaning, in the input, processing, or
output stages of creativity. Copyright law, in contrast, is interested
almost solely in the output stage and in the final creative product.
At many points, there is a match between the cognitive understanding of creativity and copyright law. Thus, as far as the use of
any type of knowledge (ideas or expression) at the time of input
and processing is concerned, copyright law allows such use because
these stages of creativity are not governed. At the output stage, so
long as the use of knowledge led to the creation of ideas or unprotected expressions (whether they are in the public domain or allowed under the fair use doctrine), it is generally not considered an
infringement under copyright law as well.
The mismatch between copyright law and the cognitive understanding of creativity is most strongly evident in the use of protected expressions during the output stage of creativity. When this
occurs during a creative activity that involves an original contribution of the second author, a derivative work is sometimes made.
389

These were the facts that led to the decision in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d
Cir. 2010).
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While the law distinguishes between a derivative work and an original work, under the cognitive understanding of creativity both are
creative activities. In contrast, while the law makes almost no distinction between derivative works and mere reproductions, the
cognitive approaches to creativity view derivative works as part of
creativity but not reproductions. It so happens that while the cognitive approaches to creativity views the use of prior expression in
the output stage of creativity as an inherent part of the creative
process, the legal doctrine sometimes prohibits this behavior and
categorizes it as copyright infringement (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Components of the Creative Process Under Each
of the Theories of Creativity390
Components
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397
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The + sign in this table indicates that, under the relevant stage and the relevant
approach, the knowledge type in the specific column is being used. Empty cells indicate
that the relevant knowledge type is not being used.
391
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
392
See id.
393
See id.
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See id.
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Knowledge acquired through education may sometimes be a protected expression.
For example, a painter that studies the cubism style and acquires knowledge about the
visual way in which Picasso expressed the minotaur figure is acquiring knowledge of an
explicit expression. If the painter uses Picasso’s minotaur figure as part of his acquired
education, he uses a protected expression.
396
Aesthetic criteria are often considered as methods, facts, or abstract ideas that are
not copyrightable. Nevertheless, aesthetic criteria at their early stages in a specific
creative field may be considered as explicit copyrightable expression. This is the case
when a second author wishes to use explicit expressions from a previous work in the same
field because of the aesthetic value he attaches to them. For example, assuming the
Picasso was the first to express the female body in a non-proportional way in which the
organs are presented as cubes, it is possible to think of such an expression as
copyrightable. A second author who applies this aesthetic criterion may be using a
protected expression. Whether this would be considered a use of expression or a use of a
mere idea depends of the level of abstraction in which the idea/expression dichotomy is
referred to.
397
See generally WALLAS, supra note 33.
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To illustrate the spectrum of the match between the cognitive
process of creation and copyright law, this Article returns to the
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the cognitive approaches to creativity is reflected by the fact that
the law allows making future works based upon Salinger’s book in
different ways. Thus, it is possible to make another book that tells
the story of a teenager going through complex adolescence in
which he critically looks at adult life without it constituting copyright infringement. Such a work would rely substantially on prior
knowledge of various types such as ideas, education, and aesthetic
criteria from the first work. A different type of use that reflects the
match between copyright law and the cognitive approaches to creativity is the use of explicit plot lines from the original work during
the input and processing phases, so long as the output does not include these expressions. Copyright law also allows the use of explicit scenes and plot lines, and even the character of Holden Caulfield, to express a different mode of expression that substantially
changes their original meaning. Under the fair use doctrine, it
would probably be permissible to use the character of Holden Caulfield and plot lines from the book to criticize the oppression of minorities in a certain country without it constituting copyright infringement. This would also allow reliance on prior knowledge.
The mismatch between copyright law and the cognitive approaches
to creativity exists when explicit protected expressions are used to
make a new work of authorship—a sequel, for example. This was
the case in Salinger v. Colting, where the court ruled that a sequel
used explicit expressions from it and therefore infringed Salinger’s
copyrights.404
This Article argues that, in order to relax the tension between
the legal doctrine and the cognitive approaches to creativity, it is
first necessary to completely separate the reproduction right from
the derivative work right. Second, in order to create a full match
between the legal doctrine and the cognitive approaches to creativity, a shift in the remedies regime is warranted. This Article does
not argue that these changes to the legal doctrine are justified solely
by the cognitive understanding of creativity; they are also justified
by intra-legal normative justifications to copyright law, which could
not be discussed here. This Article does, however, argue that such
changes could better fit the creative behavior of human beings and
404

See 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).

2017]

RECREATING COPYRIGHT

351

that, if normatively justified, they should replace the current doctrine which does not fit the behavior it governs.
CONCLUSION
There is a mismatch between important copyright law doctrines and the cognitive understanding of creativity. Specifically,
this Article focuses on the distinction between derivative works
and original works, and the idea/expression dichotomy. To substantiate this claim, it discusses theoretical approaches to creativity
as well as empirical and historical studies that focus on the process
of creation. Under all approaches to creativity, the creative process
could be divided into two main processes. The first is unfocused
thought in which abstract ideas are generated. The second refers to
the process of crystallization of the unfocused thought into concrete perceivable products using task-relevant knowledge and
memory. Both explicitly and through a suggested reading of the
literature, theoretical approaches to creativity view both ideas and
expressions as knowledge components that are inherent to the creative process.
These notions from the cognitive psychology of creativity discourse assist in portraying several potential implications for copyright law. This Article explains that one implication could apply to
the originality requirement in copyright law in that the analysis
should shift from the originality of a work as a whole to the originality of its specific components, which courts often do already. It also
suggests that post-modern approaches which require an idea of
original contribution of an individual author are not consistent with
the cognitive process of creation. While the cognitive understanding of creativity shows that many components of the creative
process are based on prior knowledge, it also acknowledges a significant independent contribution of the author.
This Article’s main goal is to articulate the argument that the
distinction copyright law makes between derivative works (based
on protected expressions) and original works (based on ideas and
unprotected expressions) is an intra-legal normative distinction and
is not based on any justification inherent to creativity. In this sense,
this Article argued that there is no qualitative difference between
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original works and derivative works under the cognitive approaches
to creativity. Likewise, the idea/expression dichotomy also finds no
justification in creativity. Therefore, if the distinction between derivative works and original works is merely a normative legal one,
the mismatch between creativity and the law could justify a more
careful evaluation of the normative intra-legal justifications to copyright law. Such evaluation will be developed in future research.

